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Introduction 
The cost of the Gulf war to many countries in the developing world has received 
scant attention in the media. The World Bank estimates that the cost of the build-up 
in the Gulf has exceeded US$ 30 billion - over half the total annual aid budget to 
developing countries. As usual, the poor will suffer most. For many families, the 
additional burden will be the straw that breaks the camel's back. 
Loss of remittances and capital from migrants working in the Gulf has delivered the 
hardest and most immediate blow to the poor. About one million people fled Kuwait after the 
invasion, most of whom were migrant workers. Hundreds of thousands have evacuated other 
Gulf countries and Iraq. An additional one million may flee Kuwait and Iraq if the war intensifies. 
Briefing Paper No.20 Page 2 
more to Viet Nam, the Philippines, Egypt and Sudan. The loss of remittances is an economic 
catastrophes for these nations. In Bangladesh remittances make up one third of foreign exchange 
earnings. In Sri Lanka remittances from workers in the Gulf and Iraq alone constitute 47% of 
foreign exchange. Massive amounts of capital, usually in the form of property, have been lost 
by migrants. Over US $1 billion was abandoned by Bangladeshi migrants and similar amounts 
have probably been lost by other nationalities. 
The bulk of resettlement costs will be borne by countries already crippled by debt. 
Returning migrants, many of whom are unskilled, are trying to find work in saturated job 
markets. In Sri Lanka, they are expected to swell unemployment figures by as much as 25%. 
Migrants are returning to towns, cities and villages where basic amenities are already stretched 
to breaking point. The social and emotional upheaval among their families and communities 
caused by their homecoming is tremendous. 
Fluctuating oil prices 
The effect of fluctuating oil prices on the economies of developing countries is less easy to 
quantify. UNCTAD (UN Committee on Trade and Development) estimated that, based on an 
oil price of US $25 a barrel, developing countries faced an average price increase of 110% (US 
$480 million) in 1990. The World Bank has estimated that if oil reaches US $30 a barrel, 
developing countries will have to spend 50% of their foreign exchange on oil imports. 
Irrespective of these estimates, the price of oil, petrol and kerosene have already risen 
sharply in many developing countries. Fuel prices have risen by 75% in Sri Lanka, 94% in the 
Philippines, and in Mozambique a 40% price hike has grounded aircraft ferrying emergency food 
aid to Niassa province. Rising oil ptices will inflate production costs in industry and mechanised 
agriculture, and provoke a hike in the cost of international transportation. As a result, developing 
countries will find their exports less competitive on international markets. 
Many developing countries have lost important export markets because of the war. The 
embargo on trade with Iraq and the loss of trade with Kuwait have been especially damaging. 
Sri Lanka's trade with Iraq and Kuwait was worth US $64 million a year. Bangladesh stands to 
lose US $300 million in exports. Prices of imported goods have risen in most developing 
countries as a result of increased shipping costs. Should the Red Sea be declared a war zone, 
and therefore not covered by maritime insurance, trade will be cut further and vital food aid 
shipments to Africa will be threatened. 
The massive reduction in international travel will drastically reduce foreign exchange 
generated by tourism. Fearing terrorist attacks on airlines, many tourists have cancelled their 
holidays. According to President Hosni Mubarak, Egypt has lost US $100 million in revenue 
from tourism. Furthermore, a severe drop in tourism may threaten many national airlines with 
insolvency. 
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Diverted aid 
There is a well-founded fear among poor nations that foreign aid to developing countries is being 
diverted to the Gulf. The Australian Government has allocated A $4.5 million to the Gulf from 
its disaster budget for this financial year. This represents a significant proportion of the total 
disaster budget and there is no indication that the Government will make an additional allocation. 
The British Government has allocated US $718,000 from its 1990/91 aid budget to the Gulf, 
without mentioning an additional allocation. 
The response from the multilateral bodies to maintaining aid flows to poor nations has 
been equally insubstantial. While the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has stepped up existing 
programs, diverted some aid from other projects and extended the scope of its Compensatory 
and Contigency Financing Facility, appeals to the IMF to respond more sympathetically have 
so far failed. Aid agencies have suggested the IMF either set up a Trust Fund paid for by the sale 
of gold (as happened during the oil crisis of 1973n4) or a supplementary fund financed by 
countries benefitting from increased oil revenue or savings. Another proposal is for the IMF to 
support the compensation mechanism provided under Article 50 of the UN Charter. This 
provides compensation to countries adversely affected by UN Security Council action. Many 
requests have already been received but the UN lacks the resources to fund this provision. A 
number of countries, including the US, are in arrears to the UN. 
Only the 'frontline states' have received special compensation. President George Bush 
has convened the Financial Accord Group comprising Western donors and creditor Gulf 
countries. The Group has pledged more than US $13 billion to be paid by 1992 of which US 
$10.5 billion will be restricted to Egypt, Jordan and Turkey. The US has also sought to cancel 
Egypt's debt of US $7.1 billion. 
So far the responses from the multilateral bodies have only addressed long-term structural 
adjustment. They have clearly failed to confront the short-term cash flow problems many 
developing countries are facing. 
"Saturation coverage has forced other international issues, such as the 
deadly combination of war and famine in Africa, off-stage." 
The media have revelled in their first 'live' war. Saturation coverage has forced other 
international issues, such as the deadly combination of war and famine in Africa, off-stage. The 
civil war in Liberia that has made half the population refugees in their own land or elsewhere 
has passed virtually unnoticed. About 14 million people in the Horn of Africa face starvation 
this year yet there are few signs of emergency aid arriving. Without media coverage, there is 
precious little public pressure on both African governments and the international community to 
respond. 
Briefing Paper No.20 Page 4 
Punishing the poor: the case of Sudan 
The devastating effects of the Gulf war on the Sudan have been exacerbated by the ruling junta's 
initial support for Iraq and its anti-Western stance. President Bashir's Government ousted the 
democratically elected regime of Sadiq el Mahdi in a bloodless coup in June 1989. The regime's 
political philosophy has been shaped by the National Islamic Front. During its shaky and deeply 
unpopular reign, the Government has propagated the civil war with the non-Muslim south using 
arms from Iraq, reimposed parts of 'sharia' (the harsh Islamic law frozen in 1985) in northern 
Sudan and banned all political parties, trade unions and the free press, committed horrific human 
rights abuses and hampered the work of Western donor governments and non-Islamic NGOs. 
Although their initial support for Iraq has been modified they are still perceived as a member of 
the pro-Iraqi camp. 
Reliable figures of Sudanese working in the Gulf are notoriously hard to come by; 
between 400,000-500,000 is a reasonable estimate. The exodus from Sudan started after the oil 
crisis of 1973-74 when the Gulf states had new-found wealth to invest and needed both skilled 
and unskilled labour from neighbouring countries. Sudanese were attracted by high salmies and 
sought to escape declining living conditions at home, which continued to fall throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. In 1988, a survey revealed the official minimum wage covered 6.5% of basic 
needs. A pattern of increasing migration and growing dependency on remittances emerged. 
Studies have shown that between 10 and 15 people are dependent on any single migrant's 
remittance. This suggests there are about 5 million people dependent of remittances in Sudan; 
a significant proportion in a country of 24 million people. Migrants remit about 80% of their 
salary and invest the remainder abroad. Remitted money is spent predominantly on domestic 
consumption, with some capital investment, usually housing. 
The monetary significance of remittances from the Gulf is enormous, but features neither 
in official government figures nor in the calculations of international banking institutions such 
as the IMF. This is because the majority of migrants do not remit their earnings through official 
channels. Unofficial channels offer a far more accessible, reliable and - most important of all -
lucrative service. In 1986 an estimated SP (Sudanese pounds) 400 million was remitted through 
official channels against SP1.4 billion unofficially. If the latter figure is included in the national 
accounts, GNP would grow from SP11.4 billion to SP16 billion - an increase of 40%! In the 
period 1978-1984, the total sum remitted through unofficial channels was estimated to be US$11 
billion- almost equal to Sudan's public external debt. If the US$12 billion invested by migrants 
overseas is included, a frighteningly clear picture emerges of the importance of remittances to 
both migrants' families and the Sudanese economy. 
Migrants returning to Sudan 
Estimates of migrants returning to Sudan since the invasion of Kuwait are difficult to make; a 
rough guess may fall between 100,000 and 200,000 people. They include those escaping Kuwait 
and Iraq, fleeing Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states for fear of a violent local reaction to their 
government's support for Iraq, and leaving Yemen following the return of 500,000 Yemenis. The 
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result of this loss in income will be a crushing blow to almost two million Sudanese. The 
repercussions will be felt throughout the country. 
Poor families in the western provinces of Darfur and Kordorfan, and in Red Sea Province 
in the east will be particularly hard hit. Drought has again struck these regions, and cash is 
essential to purchase grain, even at extortionate prices. Aid analysts believe remittances played 
a key role during the 1984-85 famine in helping many families to avert starvation. This time the 
situation is much worse and without remittances there is little hope. 
The Gulf war has plunged Sudan's economy deeper into crisis. The economy, like 
everything else, is run by an elite network of Sudanese families. In the early 1970s they attracted 
finance from the new-found wealth in the Arab world, and from western donors to invest in huge 
mechanised agricultural schemes. They creamed off huge commissions, influenced the Govern-
ment to put the lion's share of the Ministry of Agriculture's budget into these schemes and often 
·owned the land. The poor were forced to compete on unequal terms, and abandoned traditional 
environmentally sound fanning techniques in an attempt to remain competitive. Many migrated 
to find work to supplement the meagre family income. The same elite were soon buying up the 
migrant's foreign currency and not investing it in Sudan, but elsewhere. An estimated US $1.2 
billion has been invested in Egyptian real estate. The total amount of foreign exchange lost in 
capital flight is calculated to be about US $12 million. This expropriation of national resources 
had the open, or tacit consent of the international donor community, whose role is supposedly to 
improve the welfare of all Sudan's citizens rather than allow a small minority to amass huge 
fortunes. 
The mechanised agricultural schemes have been dogged by poor planning, bad manage-
ment and !ising oil prices. Since the Gulf war started, oil prices have risen by 100%. The 
resulting squeeze on already rationed allocations will create more shortages and delay deliveries 
of vital agricultural inputs to the schemes during critical times in the growing season, and so 
inhibit production. Fuel shortages will hamper the distribution and marketing of locally 
produced and imported products- including food aid- on the domestic market. This is disastrous 
to the traditionally food-deficit areas of Kordorfan and Darfur in the west, and many pmts of 
southern Sudan that are now relying on food aid getting through. Export of cash crops and other 
commodities will be hampered, reducing desperately needed foreign CUJTency earnings. 
Sudan has lost key markets in the Gulf. Egypt and Saudi Arabia have reduced trade with 
Sudan. There are strong indications that the Saudis have stopped all imports of Sudanese 
livestock. Livestock is Sudan's third biggest export earner, and Saudi Arabia wasa significant 
impo1ter, especially during the Haj (pilgrimage to Mecca) when thousands of goats and sheep 
are ritually slaughtered. The livestock market is already deeply depressed as herders sell animals 
to purchase grain: Loss of export markets will force many pastoralists to ·abandon their lifestyle 
and join the ranks of landless poor starving in shanties around Khartoum. Loss of trade in 
livestock, cotton and hides with Iraq and Kuwait will impoverish many more. 
The fall-off of trade has reduced the traffic in Port Sudan where many Beja nomads from 
the Red Sea Hills work. Families herding in the hills are dependent on remittances from relatives 
working as labourers and stevedores at the port. Hundreds have been laid off, cutting this vital 
source of cash used to buy food, and forcing many herders to sell their animals. They will become 
dependent on food aid again, as in 1984-85, although this time there is no guarantee it will ever 
arrive. 
Briefing Paper No.20 Page 6 
Impending famine in Sudan 
The response of aid donors to the impending famine has been appallingly low. The US, EC, and 
UK argued they could not pledge any food until a famine had been declared. Yet in 1985 the US 
had committed 150,000 tonnes of food aid to Sudan months before the then President Nimeiri 
admitted the extent of the catastrophe. The Sudan Government recently admitted there was a 
famine, and 1.2 million tonnes of food was needed. Only 200,000 tonnes have so far been 
pledged. 
Despite claims by Western donors that relief assistance is never tied to political considera-
tions, many believe that key donors have been dragging their feet to punish the Sudan Govern-
ment for their support of Iraq and their anti-Western rhetoric. In recent months, both the US and 
the Saudis have diverted vital shipments of wheat bound for Sudan to Dijbouti and Egypt 
respectively. These actions are overtly political. Both the US and Saudi Arabia know Sudan is 
heavily dependent on imported wheat to sell at subsidised rates to its urban population to avert 
political unrest. Two previous military regimes were deposed by civil unrest inspired by 
shortages of food and other basic commodities in the capital, Khartoum. 
Emergency aid is not the only assistance to be reduced. Kuwait cancelled a US$78 
million loan soon after it was invaded. Britain has stopped its development aid program to Sudan, 
and other Western donors have wound down their aid programs. Since the war broke out, both 
governmental and non-governmental aid offices have closed and expatriate staff returned home. 
While some are beginning to return to Sudan, the repercussions of limited financial and technical 
assistance from Western. governments and NGOs for the emergency relief program will be very 
grave. 
7.4 million people are 'at risk' of dying from starvation in Sudan this year- considerably 
more than in the famine of 1984/85. This time they are far less likely to survive. Few have fully 
recovered from the last drought. They have been forced to sell their animals, household assets 
and gold to buy grain. They are surviving on the wild fruits and beiTies they are able to collect. 
Many are now without cash remittances. Only a small proportion of the food needed has been 
pledged by foreign donors, and the Sudanese Government has exported the domestic surplus that 
was available. There is little sign of a relief plan from the Government. The rains expected from 
May onwards will halt efforts to transport food to more distant regions. The civil war and 
localised ethnic fighting continues to destroy property, equipment, animals and crops, disrupt 
supply routes and markets, divert what little food that is available to the military and undermine 
the economy to the tune of US$1 million a day. 
The Silent Famine 
This time the poor will die without a public outcry. The media fill hotels in nearby Cairo, 
Amman, Jerusalem and Jeddah. No one visits Khartoum. Without press coverage there can be 
no public outcry, and therefore limiting the public pressure on governments to respond the this 
enormous humanitarian crisis. No wonder this is being called the 'silent famine'. It is perhaps 
a fitting epitath for the millions of poor Sudanese who have been cruelly neglected and exploited 
for so long, and who are now falling victim to a war motivated by the same ruthless self interest. 
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